The epistemic model

In order to provide a semantic account of tense and the modals, Langacker invokes an idealised cognitive model or ICM (see Chapter 8), which he calls the epistemic model. Recall that the term epistemic relates to knowledge systems. The epistemic model is illustrated in Figure 18.1.

 In this model, the large circle represents immediate reality, which we can think of as ‘here and now’. This represents the ground in which the speech event occurs. The small shaded circle represents the language user. Of course, ‘reality’ is used here in the sense pertaining to the knowledge represented in the conceptual system of the individual rather than to an objective external reality. The horizontal line running through the centre of the diagram represents TIME, which Langacker (1991: 242) describes as ‘the axis along which reality evolves’. The dotted line represents TIME ‘until now’ and the continuous line represents TIME ‘after now’. Although in reality ‘now’ is momentary, speech events tend not to be momentary, so that ‘now’ as construed for linguistic purposes may be a significant period of time. This is represented by the portions of the time line inside the large circle. Of course, Cognitive Grammar is not the first or only model of language to represent tense in terms of a time line. Indeed, this approach is reminiscent of the well-known model developed by Reichenbach (1947) which we discussed in Chapter 11.

It is already clear how this model accounts for tense, at least in its core uses. While present tense refers to time inside the ground, past tense refers to the portion of time within known reality but outside the ground, and future tense refers to time in irreality, beyond the ground. This model represents a version of an ego-based model for time that we saw in Chapter 3. In Cognitive Grammar, the epistemic model also accounts for the modal verbs. While the absence of a modal verb indicates that the speaker construes the event as part of known reality (for example, Lily is a rocket scientist), the presence of a modal verb indicates that the speaker construes the event as part of irreality (for example, Lily might be a rocket scientist; Lily will be a rocket scientist).

Given the basis of this model in TIME and SPACE, reality and irreality also vary along parameters of distance, in terms of whether they are immediate (close) or non-immediate (distant) relative to the ground. This type of variation is called epistemic distance (which was also discussed in relation to Mental Spaces Theory in Chapter 11). For example, in the case of the modals, Langacker argues that the pairs that we observed earlier (for example, can and could) represent immediate versus distant irreality, respectively. Immediate irreality is close to known reality, and characterises verbs like must, will and can which encode a strong degree of obligation, likelihood or possibility. These contrast with their distal counterparts like would and could, which encode a much weaker sense of possibility, a much stronger sense of doubt, and so on. In the same way, Langacker analyses the past tense morpheme -ed as a distal morpheme, since it evokes a portion of time that belongs to known reality, but is distant relative to the ‘here and now’ of the ground. In contrast, the simple present prototypically refers to the ‘here and now’ of the ground, and its prototypical morpheme is treated as an unmarked form, or zero morpheme ø. This model therefore predicts that there will be four basic types of grounding predication, which are listed in (18).

While (18a) and (18b) relate to present and past tense, respectively, (18c) and (18d) relate to modality. Beyond these parameters of variation, tense and modality essentially belong to the same category in Cognitive Grammar: they are both types of grounding predication. As we saw in Chapter 16, the nominal grounding predication specifies an instance of a category and is itself a schematic nominal or THING. In the same way, a clausal grounding predication is a schematic PROCESS, and specifies an instance of the PROCESS category. Compare the two examples in (19).

Example (19a) is a finite clause and is therefore grounded. This means that the location of the event described in the clause is established relative to the ground in terms of (ir)reality. As a consequence, the clause is realised as a PROCESS and can stand alone as a communicative speech event. Example (19b), in contrast, is a non-finite clause. Because it is not grounded, which means that its reality status has not been established, it cannot stand alone as a communicative speech event. Clauses like this can only occur as embedded clauses, where the main clause is grounded (20). In this way, Langacker accounts for the fact that main clauses have to be finite.

Explaining the grammatical behaviour of the modals

 Cognitive Grammar exploits this epistemic account of tense and mood to explain the ‘special’ characteristics of the modal verb that were outlined above. Firstly, the fact that the modal does not inflect to form a participle or an infinitive is consistent with its role as a grounding predication: participles and infinitives are ATEMPORAL RELATIONS, while the modal is a schematic PROCESS. Secondly, this analysis also explains the fact that the modal does not participate in subject-verb agreement (*Lily musts succeed). This is because the third person present tense morpheme -s is itself a grounding predication with an opposing reality value, so the two are not expected to co-occur. Finally, the fact that the modal has to be followed by the bare infinitive form of the next verb in the string is accounted for on the basis that a grounding predication and its grounded element must match in terms of category. In other words, given that the modal represents a schematic PROCESS, its grounded element must also be a PROCESS. Of course, this claim cannot be maintained if the verb form that follows the modal is described as a ‘bare infinitive’, given that the infinitive rep resents an ATEMPORAL RELATION. In Langacker’s model, the verb form that follows the modal is described as a simple verb, which counts as a PROCESS. In other words, it encodes a temporal relation, but is uninflected because the modal performs the grounding function.

Potential and projected reality

 In the context of the epistemic distance model, the modals are characterised in terms of potential reality and projected reality. The distinction between these explains the difference between the future time epistemic modals will and may. The modal will encodes projected reality (in IMMEDIATE IRREALITY), and therefore gives rise to the future time interpretation. In contrast, may encodes only potential reality (although still in IMMEDIATE IRREALITY), hence a weaker epistemic reading. Along with Talmy (1985) and Sweetser (1990), Langacker adopts a force-dynamics model to capture this distinction between projected and potential reality. If the event is construed as having sufficient ‘momentum’ that the speaker can be confident that it will reach the predicted reality status, this is projected reality. In contrast, an event that is construed as having weaker momentum has only potential reality status. The distal counterparts of these modals are analysed along the same lines, but involve a temporal reference point more distant from the ground. As we saw in Chapter 11, essentially similar considerations motivate the Mental Spaces approach to counterfactuals.

 The polysemy of the modal verbs is also explained in force-dynamics terms. The distinction between the deontic and epistemic readings, which is often not a clear-cut distinction, relates to whether the source of the momentum is salient. If the source of the momentum is salient, this gives rise to deontic interpretations (involving obligation, permission and so on). This is illustrated by examples (21a) and (22a), where the source of the momentum or force is understood as the speaker or some other authority. If the source of the momentum is not salient, as in (21b) and (22b), this gives rise to the epistemic reading. The fact that modals are frequently ambiguous with respect to epistemic versus deontic interpretations illustrates that these are not discrete categories. For example, the sentence George must be kind is open to either a deontic or an epistemic interpretation.

اخر الاخبار

اخبار العتبة العباسية المقدسة

عبر محفل قرآني.. شعبة فاطمة بنت أسد تُحيي ذكرى وفاة السيدة خديجة (عليها السلام)

قسم صناعة الشبابيك يضع اللمسات الأخيرة لأعمال إدامة شبابيك العتبة العسكرية المقدسة

السيد السيستاني يعزي باستشهاد السيد الخامنئي

الختمة القرآنية المركزية في بغداد تشهد مشاركة طلبة الحفظ في المجمع العلمي

المزيد

الآخبار الصحية

دراسة تكشف "السبب الخفي" وراء ترك التمارين الرياضية

كشف التوقيت "المثالي" لتغيير فرشاة الأسنان

بلاستيك في أنسجة بشرية.. دراسة تكشف مفاجأة طبية

دراسة تحذر من الإفراط في ممارسة الرياضة.. كيف يضر دماءك؟

المزيد

الآخبار التكنلوجية

"ديب سيك" تحجب أحدث نماذجها عن شركات الرقائق الأميركية

"سامسونغ" تطلق سلسلة هواتف "غالاكسي إس 26"

حملات سرية ورسائل تشويه.. كيف يتم استغلال "تشات جي بي تي"؟

أثر نفسي غير متوقع للرياضة.. مرتبط بالغضب

المزيد

مواضيع ذات صلة

Tense

Mood

The grounding predication: mood and tense

The perfect construction: [have [PERF4 [V]]]

A scenario of evolution

The final stages

The progressive construction: [be1 [-ing [V]]]

The passive construction: [be2 [PERF3 [V]]]

The clausal head

English verbs: form and function

Cognitive Grammar: tense, aspect, mood and voice

Marked coding: the passive construction