The contested impact of cognitive linguistic research on the psycholinguistics of metaphor understanding
Embodied metaphor understanding: recent experimental evidence
Bodily movement and metaphor comprehension
In most theories of metaphor understanding, when people read “grasp the concept” they must inhibit the physical meaning of “grasp” to properly infer its abstract, metaphoric meaning (see Glucksberg 2001). Under this view, having people make a grasping motion before reading “grasp the concept” should interfere with their immediate processing of the phrase. Yet one recent set of studies demonstrated this was not true. Wilson and Gibbs (2006) hypothesized that if abstract concepts are indeed understood as items that can be acted upon by the body, then performing a related action should facilitate sensibility judgments for a figurative phrase that mentions this action. For example, if participants first move their arms and hands as if to grasp something, and then read “grasp the concept,” they should verify that this phrase is meaningful faster than when they first performed an unrelated body action. Engaging in body movements associated with these phrases should enhance the online simulations that people create to form a metaphorical understanding of abstract notions, such as “concept,” even if “concepts” are not things that people can physically grasp.
In fact, a computerized reading-time study showed that participants responded more quickly to the metaphorical phrases that matched the preceding action (e.g., the motor action grasp was followed by “grasp the concept”), than to the phrases that did not match the earlier movement (e.g. the motor action kick was followed by “grasp the concept”). People were also faster in responding to the metaphor phrases having performed a relevant body movement than when they did not move at all. In short, performing an action facilitates understanding of a metaphoric phrase containing that action word. A second study showed that same pattern of bodily priming effects when participants were asked to imagine performing the actions before they made their speeded responses to word strings. This result reveals that real movement is not required to facilitate metaphor comprehension, only that people mentally simulate such action.
Controlled studies demonstrated that these findings were not due to simple lexical associations created from doing or imagining the actions and seeing specific words in the phrases.
Most generally, processing metaphoric meaning is not just a purely cognitive act, but involves some imaginative understanding of the body’s role in structuring abstract concepts. People may create embodied simulations of speakers’ messages that involve moment-by-moment “what must it be like” processes that make use of ongoing tactile-kinesthetic experiences. These simulations processes operate even when people encounter language that is abstract, or refer to actions that are physically impossible to perform.